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[This section of the Journal has been added for the exclusive use of the National Association of
County and Prosecuting Attorneys. The selection and editing of the material contained herein is
the sole responsibility of Mr. Patrick Brennan, the Association's First Vice-President. However,
neither Mr. Brennan, the Association, nor the Journal assumes any responsibility for the views ex-
pressed by the authors of articles appearing in this section.]
Editor: Patrlck Brennan, Prosecuting Attorney, South Bend, Indiana
PROSECUTORS AND POLICE-THEIR COMMON BOND
STEPHEN P. KENNEDY
The author has been Police Commissioner of New York City since 1955. His appointment as
Commissioner climaxed a career of 26 years as a member of the police force. Among his many other
accomplishments, Commissioner Kennedy is a law school graduate of New York University and a
member of the New York Bar. In fact, his career has been so colorful and his professional reputation
so well established that Time Magazine, in its July 7, 1958 issue, carried an extensive account of
Commissioner Kennedy and his work on the police force of New York City. The present article
by Commissioner Kennedy is based upon a speech he delivered in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on July
29, 1958, at the annual meeting of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys.
Law enforcement functions best when police and
prosecutors work in harmony for the public good.
Though our spheres of authority in the field of law
enforcement are separate and distinct, we still have
a common bond: the proper and effective adminis-
tration of the criminal law.
I would like tc" think of this meeting of the
National Association of County and Prosecuting
Attorneys as being in the nature of a law enforce-
ment "Summit Conference," aimed at combatting
the national upsurge in crime. The common enemy
is that small hard core composed of those who
refuse to abide by the rules laid down by society
and who demand, often by use of force and vio-
lence, unconditional surrender of their victims.
The criminal law attempts to prevent socially
undesirable behavior that has been labeled crime
by providing sanctions against transgressors. In
other words, it attempts to substitute rules of
civilized society for the law of the jungle. Year by
year, however, we see this concept being thwarted
by a growing philosophy that everyone else is
responsible for the criminal act but the one who
committed it. The evil effects of this pervasive
theory of guilt transference on good government
must be made manifest to all.
In attempting to bring the violator to justice,
law enforcement is at a great disadvantage, as it
always is in a democracy. The odds are weighted
heavily in favor of the criminal. He can, and
usually does, make careful plans before executing
his criminal schemes. He selects his own time to
strike on a battleground of his choice. Invariably
the element of surprise is his. Therefore, as you
gentlemen know from bitter experience, few coun-
terattacks can be launched by police or prosecutor
until an overt criminal act has been committed.
Then the onerous task of tracking down the perpe-
trator is begun, often without the aid of a witness
or a clue. In a large city, such as New York, that
might mean any one of some eight million people.
Questioning each of them would be a physical
impossibility; and even if this were possible, each
would have the legal right to refrain from answer-
ing questions.
Where we develop information pointing to a
suspect, he must and should be accorded the many
important legal rights that safeguard him. Before
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an arrest can be made, probable cause must be
shown. There are also many other restrictions,
including those against entrapment and unauthor-
ized searches and seizures to obtain evidence. But
what is or is not legally permissible as an investiga-
tory technique frequently turns on hairline court
decisions.
Too often the public, and the courts, too, if you
please, fail to realize the grave responsibilities and
problems that confront the police officer in the
daily performance of his duties. He is required by
law to preserve public peace, protect life and
property, to prevent crime and to arrest those who
violate the law. This is a large order.
A recent New York case is indicative of one of
the problems encountered by an officer on patrol.
A police officer observed a stolen automobile pro-
ceeding along the avenue. When the car stopped
for a red light, the officer approached the stolen
vehicle and ordered the driver out. The driver
responded by starting the car in motion and at the
same time appeared to be reaching for a weapon
at his side. The policeman shot him. The car then
veered to the right and struck a pedestrian who
subsequently sued the city and the officer for
damages. He based his cause of action on allega-
tions of reckless and unreasonable conduct on the
part of the police officer! Fortunately, an under-
standing judge appreciated the officer's predica-
ment. Mr. Justice Coleman of the New York
Supreme Court had this to say: "Reasonableness
is not to be determined in retrospect from the
vantage point of the security of a courtroom and
with time for taking thought. It must be deter-
mined by reference to circumstances almost
instantaneous in sequence. And just as 'detached
reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of
an uplifted knife' so the police officer was not called
upon to make nice calculations of the consequence
of his act when confronted with an automobile thief
attempting to escape who also seemed ready to do
him harm. The officer was required to act, and to
act quickly, and he cannot be held responsible for
all that followed."'
Consider another situation. An officer on a late
tour observed a man who aroused his suspicions.
After searching the suspect, the officer found a
loaded revolver in his overcoat pocket and ar-
rested him. This officer had no actual legal grounds
on which to search the criminal. Had he been
Engesser v. City of New York, New York Law
Journal, Nov. 21, 1956.
wrong in his suspicions, instead of the suspect
being a defendant in a criminal action, it might
well have developed that the officer would find
himself the defendant in a civil or, possibly a
criminal, action. On the other hand, if the man
were not searched by the policeman (who knew his
law) because of the restrictions on search and
seizure, and the man murdered one or more
persons, what opinion would the community have
of that officer? What other course of action was
available to a conscientious policemen? And yet
we find such language as this in some court opin-
ions: "The officer has no judicial immunity for
errors in judgment. He must be right or suffer.'u
In other words, the policeman is expected to be
infallible. On the other hand, however, it frequently
happens that the learned judges of the Supreme
Court of the United States, in reviewing the ac-
tions of a police officer, divide by a five to four
vote in determining whether he was legally right
or wrong. But the policeman must always be right!
In many situations the officer cannot indulge in
the luxury of a leisurely consideration of whether
or not he is proceeding in accordance with the most
minute provisions of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure and the latest judicial decisions. Should he
fail to take prompt, decisive police action, and
delay for the purpose of deliberating upon the
niceties of the legal problem involved, an innocent
person may be maimed or killed. The officer has no
margin of error!
Law enforcement officers abhor dictatorial
power and the oppressive methods of the police
state. They are dedicated to the preservation of
our human liberties and to the basic concept that
it is the duty of government to assure maximum
protection, in an ordered society, with minimum
restrictions on personal freedom. The problem that
is presented is how to reconcile the opposing desires
of the individual for unlimited liberty on the one
hand and, on the other, the desire of society for
protection from the criminal.
"We all declare for liberty; but in using the
same word we do not all mean the same thing.
With some the word liberty may mean for each man
to do as he pleases .... The shepherd drives the
wolf from the sheep's throat, for which the sheep
thanks the shepherd as his liberator, while the
wolf denounces him for the same act as the de-
stroyer of liberty .... Plainly the sheep and the
wolf are not agreed upon a definition of the word
2 People v. Esposito, 194 N. Y. Supp. 326 (1922).
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liberty; and precisely the same difference prevails
among us human creatures... and all professing
to love liberty!" These are the words of Abraham
Lincoln, from an address delivered in Baltimore in
1864.
The position of law enforcement is further com-
plicated because of the dual control stemming from
our federal system of government.
Prior to 1923, The United States Supreme
Court did not disturb state criminal convictions
on constitutional grounds except those involving
a denial of equal protection of the law because of
discrimination in the selection of jurors. Since that
time, there has been a gradual increase in the
court's willingness to review state criminal pro-
ceedings. This has been particularly noticeable in
connection with the use of confessions in state
prosecutions. And in federal cases the Court has
gone the full limit. For instance, in the celebrated
case of Mallory v. U.S., 3 the Court reversed the
conviction of a rapist solely on the ground that
there had been an undue delay in arraignment.
Although .this case involved a federal prosecution,
the handwriting may be on the state courthouse
wall.
The language in the Mallory case indicates that
when an arrest is made, the police are powerless to
do little more than to arraign the prisoner before
the court. He may be taken to the station house
for booking, but your case may be in jeopardy if
you ask him any question designed to elicit damag-
ing statements.
Do the courts have implicit faith in the ability of
the police and prosecutor to develop sufficient legal
proof to obtain a conviction without questioning
suspects? The details as to how this clairvoyance
shall be accomplished are not readily supplied.
Police and piosecutors welcome guarantees of
increasing fairness in the disposition of criminal
cases. But there must be a judicial recognition of
the fact that there is a responsibility to show fair-
ness to the individual, law abiding citizen whose
life, liberty, and property are endangered by the
predatory criminal. The potential victim must also
be protected by guarantees of fairness in criminal
procedure.
In 1949 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the provisions of the fourth amendment
of the federal constitution, securing privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police, are basic
to a free socifty and apply to the states by virtue
3 354 U. S. 449 (1957).
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The court, however, explicitly left the states
free to admit or exclude evidence unlawfully ob-
tained. 4 The rationale of the position of the
majority of states in admitting illegally seized
evidence is perhaps best expressed by Judge Car-
dozo, writing for the New York Court of Appeals
22 years ago when he said: "The pettiest peace
officer may have it in his power, through overzeal
or indiscretion, to confer immunity upon an
offender the most flagitious." 5 However, the
Supreme Court of California recently overruled
long-standing precedent by excluding evidence
which was the fruit of an unlawful search and
seizure.6
In a recent case a New York City policeman, in
the course of another investigation, came upon
information disclosing the violation of federal law
prohibiting the possession and transportation of
distilled spirits on which no tax had been paid.
Accordingly, he turned this information over to
the federal authorities. At the ensuing trial in a
federal court, the officer testified that the discovery
of the crime was obtained through the use of a
wiretap, which had been authorized by court
order, as was permissible under New York law.
The petitioner moved to suppress the evidence.
The motion was denied and the petitioner was
found guilty. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the lower courts. It did
not base its decision on constitutional grounds,
but, rather, on the fact that Section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act had been violated
by the officer when he divulged the intercepted
communication, and, consequently, the informa-
tion was tainted and not usable as evidence.
There has been considerable controversy in the
press, as well as in legal circles, as to the full
import of this case, Benanti v. U.S.
The Supreme Court in the Benanti case inferred
that a police officer, by testifying to the contents
of an intercepted communication, 'commits a
crime-a violation of federal law. Thus, though
such evidence may be properly obtained by author-
ity of a state statute and admissible in state courts,
it might put the police officer in an extremely
precarious position in that he may be subject to
federal prosecution. Might not this bring about a
4 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
5 People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585
(1926).
6 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905
(1955).
7 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
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